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The history of regional and international integration in the Arab world is replete with
examples of unrealized aspirations toward greater trading ows. Beginning with early
intra-regional attempts at organizing transit trade in 1953, to the Agreement on the
Arab Common Market in 1964, to the Agreement on the facilitation and promotion of
intra-Arab trade in 1981, tangible results from these agreements have remained somewhat
elusive (Romagnoli & Mengoni 2009). The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA),
which came into full force in January 2005, appears to demonstrate some initial promise
in boosting trade ows (Abedini & P eridy 2008), but a full accounting of its true impact
remains to be done.
These attempts at trade promotion have also been accompanied by an ever-increasing
proliferation of regional economic blocs, such as the Arab Maghreb Union, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, and the Arab League,1 not
to mention inter-regional bodies such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference. These arrangements generally declare, inter
alia, trade enhancement as an objective in their texts and charters. The success of these
blocs in meeting this particular objective, however, remains uncertain.
The scope and complexity of these international trading arrangements|coupled with
their spotty historical record of success|underscores the urgent need for an adequate
understanding of the relative costs and benets of participation in preferential trading
arrangements and, more generally, of changes in the domestic import regime. Such an
understanding can be important in tempering any ambivalence due to uncertainty about
trade outcomes arising from reform, and can be useful in helping design mitigation mech-
anisms and adaptation strategies.
This paper provides estimates of the adjustment costs associated with several hypoth-
esized changes in trade policy for Syria. In particular, it employs a partial equilibrium
model of domestic demand for imports to generate estimates of the trade ow and scal
revenue implications for two broad classes of hypothetical scenarios: (a) Participation in
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), in particular the to-be-implemented Associa-
tion Agreement between the European Union and Syria (EUSAA); (b) Changes in the
domestic import regime, including the introduction of a value added tax (VAT, currently
being considered by the Ministry of Finance), a reduction in the number of non-zero tari
1The rst comprising the North African states of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia;
the second link the oil-producing states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United
Arab Emirates; the third is composed of the Gulf and Maghreb Union countries (except Mauritania)
plus Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and the Mashreq countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the West Bank);
and the last group adds Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan.
2bands and the elimination of the convoluted system of municipal border taxes. Finally,
we propose a comprehensive reform that targets all of these challenges jointly.
We nd that the revenue consequences of the rst scenario may be substantial, and
that an informed choice of an exclusion list for the agreement may not only signicantly
aect its revenue consequences, but may also markedly inuence the relative vulnerability
of dierent sectors. We show that a proper sequencing of the reform requires close
attention to the fact that the Syrian import regime levies \nuisance taris" on almost
60% of tari lines.2 Naturally, the nal liberalization step will have a revenue impact
that is perhaps larger than expected.
Our analysis of the second scenario suggests that the number of tari bands can be
reduced to a lower number, while ensuring revenue neutrality. The driving factor behind
the impact of such a reform is once again the decision how to deal with the high number
of nuisance rates. Both an elimination of all these taris and an increase of all rates to 5%
will trigger a revenue impact of a large magnitude. We further show that the elimination
of additional import taxes is a realistic option. More specically, revenue neutrality can
be attained by implementing a VAT of sucient but reasonable size.
Our policy simulations are implemented using the Tari Reform Impact Simulation
Tool (trist), developed by the World Bank's International Trade Department. The
model is based on a representative consumer with Armington (1969)-style preferences,
who makes choices over traded goods in three consecutive steps: First, by substitut-
ing between dierent exporters following relative price changes between their respective
products; second, by substituting between imports and domestically-produced goods fol-
lowing relative price changes between them; and third, by changing their demand for the
good in question as a result of the change in the overall price of the product (Brenton,
Saborowski, Staritz & von Uexkull 2009).3 A similar setup has been widely adopted in
applied trade models, such as single- or multi-country computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models. TRIST has been designed with the specic task of providing policy mak-
ers with important insights into the short-term eects of trade reform. It has not been
designed for making longer-term predictions about the economy wide impact of trade
reform; TRIST only looks at the import side of the economy whereas trade reform will
2Nuisance taris are dened by the WTO as taris that are so low that the administrative costs of
collecting them are higher than the revenue they generate. There is no denitive level at which a tari
becomes a nuisance. A small tari on a good that is imported in regular quantities by a small number
of importers may generate more revenue than it costs, as is the case for crude oil). For simplicity, this
study refers to all taris below 5% as nuisance taris. This does not change the fact, however, that it
is important to investigate each nuisance tari on a case-by-case basis in order to be able to determine
whether it should be eliminated or not.
3Due to data limitations, however, the model that we eventually apply does not admit this nal eect;
that is, the substitution between imports and domestically produced goods is perfectly inelastic.
3also have an impact on exporting sectors by reducing bias against exporting.
Although the analysis that we perform in this paper is partial equilibrium in nature,
there are several reasons why this is reasonably warranted in the Syrian context. First,
little is known about the production structure of the Syrian economy. Until the 1990s,
Syrian output was dominated by state-owned enterprises operating under a highly cen-
tralized structure. Since then, Syrian output has experienced a rising share of the private
sector, mainly in the form of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As a consequence,
data for the production side of the economy remain scarce,4 and are potentially unreliable.
Second, while Syrian exports have demonstrated a steady decrease in concentration
over the past decade, imports have remained largely diversied. Herndahl indices for
exports fell from 0.62 in 2001 to 0.14 in 2007,5 while Herndahls for imports averaged
0.03 (with standard deviation of 0.04) over the same period. This suggests that the
production structure of the economy is in a state of ux, and hence for the purposes of
analysis it is more helpful to concentrate on the action on the demand side. Moreover,
given the medium to long-run nature of general equilibrium analysis, the immediate
impact of short-run changes|which are mainly concentrated on the demand side|is
more important for the purposes of understanding direct adjustment costs and designing
appropriate mitigation mechanisms.
Third, the partial equilibrium model used is suciently simple and straightforward
that any assumptions made, especially with regard to underlying parameters, remain
transparent and replicable. Importantly, this implies that government ocials can adapt
the model to their own prior assumptions and scenarios, and run policy-relevant simu-
lations of their own, in lieu of direct technical assistance from external experts. This
increases government participation from the client country, as well as ownership of any
results that we report.6
The trade policy literature identies three main barriers to tari reform. First, there
may be concern about the scal implications of reform, especially with regard to lost
revenue (Mitra 1992). This is often more acute in developing economies, where capacity
constraints related to the collection technology are usually more binding; taris and
4The World Bank, as part of its technical assistance on human development, is currently in the process
of compiling an updated social accounting matrix for Syria. However, this program is in its preliminary
stages and data are currently unavailable as inputs for analytical purposes.
52007 is the latest year for which data are available. Herndahls are calculated from 4-digit HS lines
and normalized assuming the full quorum of 1,213 lines is met, such that the support for these values
are given by [0;1].
6We are also aware that other approaches exist for simulating the trade, revenue, and welfare impli-
cations of tari reform. In our view, the adoption of a given modeling strategy is usually a matter of
taste. We would stress that one major advantage of our approach, however, is that our reliance on highly
disaggregated transactions-level data is likely to improve the quality of the nal estimates.
4trade taxes are often preferred due to the relative simplicity of their administration and
enforcement. Moreover, intra-government conict over which body would bear the burden
of tari removal may further delay socially-benecial reform Alesina & Drazen (1991).
Second, there may be uncertainty over the beneciaries of tari reform. This point was
rst made in the context of trade policy reform by Fern andez & Rodrik (1991), who
argue that this uncertainty leads to an impasse among involved agents and a bias toward
the status quo. Third, there are political economy factors that may lead to resistance
against tari reform. Lobbying activity by special interest groups can lead to a situation
where protection is observed in (political) equilibrium (Grossman & Helpman 1994).
Even in the absence of such special interest pressures, the response to general-interest
voting behavior|in particular the tari preferences of the median voter|may induce
tari barriers in specic sectors (Mayer 1984).
By quantifying the scal impact of trade adjustment, this paper aims to directly ad-
dress the rst and second channels by which trade reform may be delayed. To tackle
the rst issue, we consider scenarios where we explicitly target ineciencies in the sys-
tem and seek to uncover driving factors in ensuring that the respective reforms remain
largely revenue-neutral. In addition, since the model we use makes any expected losses
transparent, the burden of reform|as well as the likely bearers of this burden|would
be precisely articulated. This transparency is also key to ensuring that uncertainty over
the possible benets of trade reform do not paralyze the relevant policymakers. Finally,
we are of the view that a clear accounting of the adjustment costs associated with tar-
i reform can also inform key stakeholders and improve the outcomes that result from
political-economic activity (the third channel). For example, if notions of fairness play
a nontrivial role in inuencing the perceptions of voters (Davidson, Matusz & Nelson
2006), then making clear the relative costs of trade adjustment can facilitate the process
of trade liberalization.
The literature on trade reform in Syria is relatively thin. Chemingui & Dessus (2008)
utilize a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the costs of nontari
barriers in Syria, and estimate that the eective protection aorded by such technical
barriers to trade amount to more than twice that of taris. However, while their model
considers important policy exercises|such as the full dismantling of taris and quanti-
tative restrictions, and a removal of foreign exchange restrictions|some of these policy
proposals have already come to pass (notably the unication of the parallel exchange rate
regime), and their study is focused on the costs of nontari, rather than explicit tari,
barriers. Gait an & Lucke (2007) conduct policy experiments along similar lines using a
dynamic CGE model, with a stronger focus on PTAs. Unlike this paper, their analysis
5is focused on examining changes in macroeconomic aggregates as well as output at the
sectoral level, rather than scal considerations.7 Finally, Abedini & P eridy (2008) econo-
metrically estimate the trade eects due to GAFTA, using a modied gravity model.
While their work, like ours, works with commodity-level data, the paper concerns itself
mainly with the eect of GAFTA on realized trade ows, not adjustment costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction, we sketch the model
(Section 2) that underlies the simulation results (Section 3), which include the broad
scenarios outlined above. This is followed by reections on the appropriate policy mix
for further consolidating import liberalization in Syria (Section 4), before a nal section
concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Tradable Goods Demand
Consider an economic environment comprised of goods indexed by i = 1;:::;n varieties
originating from countries indexed by j = 1;:::;m. Let a small, open economy be
comprised of a single representative consumer possessing standard Armington (1969)-
type preferences given by8
U (x;x








im] is the vector of imports of a given good i from each of the m
countries, and xi = [xi1 xim] is the vector of analogous goods produced at home. For
simplicity, we follow the literature and assume that (1) is homogeneously separable in
the n goods, so that we can rewrite this as






i) are indexes of consumption of each type of good (both home and for-
eign, respectively). These indexes further nest sub-indexes of goods among competing
7A working paper version (Lucke 2001) does examine scal consequences in greater detail, especially
in relation to macro variables such as the government decit and the current account balance.
8The limitations of imposing Armington-type preferences on consumers are well documented (Lloyd &
Zhang 2006). For our purposes of analyzing scenarios associated with trade policy changes, however, two
concerns are relevant: First, that the monopoly power associated with each exporting country overstates
the terms of trade eects of tari elimination, and second, that the absence of product variety changes
understates welfare gains. We address the rst concern directly, by providing sensitivity analyses for the
preference parameters that we assume. We address the second issue somewhat indirectly, by focusing on
the trade ow and trade revenue eects, rather than welfare eects, of the dierent scenarios.
6producers, which are weakly separable between home and foreign goods:
vi (xi;x
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We make the further assumption that both the top-level utility function V () and the
second-level sub-utility functions vi () and wi () possess a constant elasticity of substi-















m i = 1 and  >  1. The consumer faces a vector of corresponding prices
p = [p11 p1m pn1 pnm], and will maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint
px0 = y, where y is national income. Armington (1969) shows that this leads to standard









where xi and pi are indexes of goods and prices, respectively, and ES  1
1+ is the elas-
ticity of substitution between dierent exporters of a given product. The formulation of
this demand function shows how the substitution of products in consumer demand works
in this class of models: the Armington model treats substitution between products as im-
perfect (and as dependent on the substitution elasticity). Analogous demand functions
can be derived for the total demand for good i, XTD
i , which is a function of the relative
price of good i and the price elasticity of demand, P, as well as for the demand for
imports relative to domestic production.
Taking the model discussed above as its theoretical foundation, the empirical model
that we take to the data makes some further assumptions: it normalizes the world market
price of each product to unity and models its market separately from all other products.9
A product's price is thus equal to one plus any tari and import charges levied on it
9Products are dierentiated at the tari line level. The assumption could pose a problem if, for
example, consumers routinely substitute coee for tea when their relative prices change. We do not
regard this as a major concern, since such substitution between distinctly dierent products typically
occur only in cases where the price changes are fairly large, while the price eects of most trade policy
changes are generally more modest.
7at the border. We further assume that any changes in taris and charges are perfectly
passed through to the nal consumer.
On the basis of this Armington (1969)-style model, price changes impact demand for
a product from a given supplier through three channels: through an exporter substitu-
tion eect, which is the consumption response to relative price changes between dierent
national suppliers; through a demand|or income|eect, as consumption of a product
changes in response to a change in its overall price; and through a domestic substitution
eect (which due to data limitations we do not capture). For our purposes, then, the




eters. The precise calculation steps have been documented in Brenton et al. (2009) and
are, for completeness, reproduced in the technical appendix.
Finally, implicit in our empirical model is at least one additional technical assumption:
since demand responses are based on elasticities, there will never be market entry by new
exporters as a result of price changes (zero trade ows will always remain unchanged at
zero).
This paper extends the standard trist model described in Brenton et al. (2009)
in two ways. First, we advance the static simulations associated with a single year
to include sequential simulations that take into account multi-year tari liberalization
scenarios. Second, we include scenarios that allow for variations in other categories of
border-related charges, such as the spending tax and the revenue tax, as well as the
implementation of a VAT. It is important to remember, however, that TRIST has been
designed with the specic task of providing policy makers with important insights into
the short-term eects of trade reform. It has not been designed for making longer-term
predictions about the economy wide impact of trade reform; TRIST only looks at the
import side of the economy whereas trade reform will also have an impact on exporting
sectors by reducing bias against exporting.
3 Analysis of Trade-Related Adjustment Costs
3.1 Description of the data
We use proprietary data provided by Syrian Customs, which were collected via the newly-
implemented Automated System for Customs Data (asycuda) system, for Syrian cus-
toms posts employing the system over the period between January and end-July 2009.
The data set comprises information on all import transactions at the 8-digit harmonized
system (HS) level, including information on trading partners, c.i.f. import values, col-
8lected tari revenue and tari exemptions, as well as all additional charges applied at
the border. The data also include information on customs procedure codes (CPC), which
allow us to exclude imports from the data set that do not enter the Syrian market for
the sole purpose of private domestic consumption.10
asycuda has, to date, only been partially implemented. According to the Customs
directorate, the system covered 75% of all Syrian imports in January 2009. This share
has been steadily increasing since, reaching 85% in June 2009, and is expected to have
attained almost full coverage (98%) by the end of 2009. For the purpose of this study,
this data limitation is not unproblematic. However, Syrian customs authorities have
veried that the data present a fairly representative sample of imports across products
and trading partners.11
The data set comprises Syrian imports on a total of 3,183 tari lines and 126 trading
partners. The total value of imports amounts to SYP 607.3 billion. On these imports,
SYP 39.3 billion worth of tari revenue and SYP 66.8 billion worth of overall trade tax
revenue (including tari revenue) were collected. Collected tari revenue thus makes up
58.9% of overall trade tax revenue. The statutory tari rate across all tari lines, calcu-
lated as a simple average, is 11.1% (the import-weighted average is 7.0%). The equivalent
numbers for the collected tari rate are 10.7% and 6.5%, respectively. These gures sug-
gest that tari exemptions granted at the Syrian border are substantial, although not
excessively large compared with other middle-income economies. A simple simulation
using the model described in Section 2 shows that a trade reform that eliminates all
tari exemptions would increase Syrian tari revenue by about SYP 2.6 billion, which is
equivalent to 6.5% of the current total.12
Table 1 illustrates how taris are distributed across tari bands for trading partners
with whom Syria is currently not involved in a preferential trade agreement.13 The table
dierentiates 11 tari bands that correspond to the 11 actual bands in the Syrian tari
schedule (1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60%). As can be seen, the distribution
of statutory taris is highly skewed. Almost 60% of tari lines are subject to nuisance
10These include, for example, goods in transit, government imports, and goods destined for warehous-
ing.
11It is possible to make simple extrapolations, based on our knowledge of the extent of coverage across
time, in order to recover reasonable numbers that are applicable at the national level for the full calendar
year. More specically, given the preceding discussion, we suggest a multiplication factor close to two
for all numbers not expressed in percentage terms.
12As will become clear, our explicit accounting for tari exemptions is central to our study of scal
costs. The importance of the careful treatment of import concessions for studies analyzing trade policy
changes is a general point that has been previously emphasized by Ianchovichina (2004).
13Notice that this implies that the total of 2,895 tari lines is lower in this table than the total across
all countries (3,183 tari lines) including those in preferential trade agreements with Syria.
9taris (taris of 5% or below). These account for more about 70% of imports and 27%
of total revenues. The remaining tari lines are relatively evenly distributed across the
rest of the tari bands.
Collected tari rates are only slightly more skewed toward the lower end of the distri-
bution than statutory rates. Although tari exemptions seem limited in magnitude, the
data reveal that, taking them into account, 1.3% of tari lines are subject to taris close
to zero, whereas only 0.1% (two lines) are subject to statutory taris within the same
band. Overall, the table highlights the fact that, for any eective reform of the Syrian
trade regime, it will be crucial to pay close attention to products on which nuisance taris
are levied, as this is where a large share of the burden of tari collection ultimately falls.
As a check for the consistency of the data set with other published trade data, we
compare the 10 most important import partners and products (by 3-digit isic code) for
2007 and 2009 (Table 2), using UN comtrade data for2007 against Customs' asycuda
data for 2009. The data exhibit a signicant degree of overlap. 7 of the top 10 partners
(8 if we allow the fact that EU imports are mainly from Italy) are common across the two
years, as are 7 of the top 10 products. China, the EU, Turkey, and Arab countries such
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia are, unsurprisingly, among Syria's most important trading
partners.
One important complication that needs to be addressed in any study of the Syrian
import regime is the enormous number of nontari charges applied at the border. In
addition to a spending tax and a revenue tax, there are in excess of a hundred other
possible additional charges. This is complicated by the fact that some charges, including
both fees and taxes, are levied on the import declaration, while others are levied on the
imported item|with complicated rules for what constitutes the appropriate base for each
charge.14 In the simulations that follow, we focus on the three major revenue-generating
sources|taris, the spending tax, and the revenue tax|and aggregate all additional
charges into an \all other charges" category, in order to maintain transparency.15
Finally, to keep the presentation clean, we also aggregate import values and trade tax
revenues across four trading partner groups, consistent with their importance within the
Syrian import regime. These are Turkey, GAFTA, the EU, and the Rest of the World
14Given that the latter charges are of a small magnitude, we simplify by distributing them evenly
across items in a given declaration.
15In the Syrian customs regime, tari revenue is calculated as a percentage of the c.i.f. import value,
and both the spending and the revenue tax are calculated as a percentage of the tari inclusive import
value. Some of the other taxes and charges are weighted averages of various dierent tax bases. For





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2 Trade policy scenarios
We apply the model described in Section 2 to two broad classes of policy scenarios: (a)
participation in PTAs; and (b) changes in the domestic import regime. We illustrate the
rst scenario by considering both the static as well as sequential eects of the forthcoming
EUSAA. We conceive of the second as a rationalization of border charges that simplies
the number of tari bands, together with the concurrent introduction of a VAT coupled
with the elimination of other trade taxes. We close the subsection with two hypothetical
comprehensive reform scenarios that target all these changes simultaneously.17
In all our baseline scenarios, the simulation assumes model elasticity parameters that
equal to P = 1:5 and ES = 0:5 (default elasticities). These elasticities are fairly stan-
dard in the literature, although we recognize that country- and time-specic idiosyncrasies
may call for variations to this default. Accordingly, in our robustness checks (Subsec-
tion 3.4), we allow these parameters to systematically vary, and consider the sensitivity
of our ndings to variations in these parameters.
3.2.1 Participation in preferential trade agreements
The two PTAs that are currently of greatest relevance to Syria are the Syria-Turkey
bilateral and GAFTA. Syria has also (re)initialed the EUSAA in December 2008, and the
agreement is currently awaiting ratication in the European Parliament, as well as nal
signatures from both parties. Given the importance of the European Union as a trading
partner for the Syrian economy,18 the trade and revenue consequences of the agreement
are of major concern to Syrian policymakers.19
The EUSAA is to operate following a schedule that sequences in the reforms over a
period of 12 years. As a benchmark, however, we rst consider a single-phased agreement
(Table 3), with three alternative degrees of residual protection, as represented by the
16The results presented in the subsequent section are, however, not sensitive to a change in the number
of country groupings used.
17All reform options are analyzed with an eye on identifying the core factors that determine whether
revenue neutrality is attained. Given the relative simplicity of our methodology, however, we tend to
discount the specic numerical values of the estimates and refrain from making precise projections of
the likely impact of the reforms. We instead concentrate on the qualitative implications, especially with
regard to substantial dierences in estimated magnitudes.
18Notice that tGermany is not included in the EU aggregate in Table 2; what is more, Syrian policy-
makers regard the EU as a key partner due to the region's geographical proximity as well as its potential
as a major market for Syrian exports.
19Indeed, Syria cited uncertainty about the impact of the agreement on the Syrian economy as a
justication for delaying the signing till the start of 2010.
13coverage of the exclusion list: (a) no exclusion list (column 1); (b) 10 percent exclusion
(column 2); and (c) 20 percent exclusion (column 3), with the specic items on the
exclusion list chosen to minimize the revenue impact of the agreement.20
Table 3: Static trade impact of a single-phased Association Agreement
with the EUy
No exclusion list 10% exclusion list 20% exclusion list
Impact on imports
Imports pre 607.3* 607.3 607.3
Imports post 611.1 609.0 608.7
Change (%) 0.6 0.3 0.2
Impact on revenue
Tari revenue pre 39.3 39.3 39.3
Tari revenue post 29.8 36.0 37.2
Change (%) -24.3 -8.6 -5.3
Total import tax revenue
Total revenue pre 66.8 66.8 66.8
Total revenue post 57.0 63.3 64.6
Change (%) -14.7 -5.1 -3.2
Collected tari rates
Tari rate pre 6.5 6.5 6.5
Tari rate post 4.9 5.9 6.1
Change (%) -24.8 -8.8 -5.5
y Scenarios simulated assuming elasticity parameters of P = 0:5 and ES = 1:5. Exclusion lists
were selected to minimize revenue impact. All taris on EU imports not on the EU exclusion
list are set to zero.
* All values are given in in billions of SYP.
The rst three rows of Table 3 report the impact of the reform scenario on total
imports, while the next blocks of information illustrate the impact on tari revenue,
total revenue generated on imports, and collected tari rates. The gures reported in
the rst column of the table suggest that the EUSAA, if implemented in its most radical
form, may lead to considerable losses in Syrian revenues. The complete elimination of
taris on EU products is projected to lead to a 24.3% decline in tari revenue, with total
trade tax revenues falling by 14.7% and the average import weighted collected tari rate
20According to WTO rules, preferential trade agreements must be characterized by a reciprocal rather
than a unilateral reduction in taris. Article 24 of the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT),
however, emphasizes that certain sectors can be excluded from liberalization by calling for a liberalization
of \substantially all trade" only. This clause is commonly interpreted as demanding a liberalization of
at least 80% of all trade between the parties to the agreement. In principle, the countries involved are
free to choose the 20% of trade for which taris are to be left unchanged.
14dropping by 1.6 percentage points to 4.9%. The second and third columns of the table do
show, however, that the impact of the agreement is likely to be attenuated signicantly by
determining a list of products to be excluded from liberalization. Depending on the size
of the exclusion list, our model projects a reduction in total revenues from import taxes
of between 3.2{5.1%. Given that an appropriate sequencing of the reform may allow the
spread of these losses over the course of a 20-year period, we do not regard these losses
as excessive.
Irrespective of the revenue implications of the agreement, the fall in prices of imported
goods in response to tari liberalization is advantageous for consumers to the extent that
these taris are not protecting signicant amounts of production and employment.21 It
is therefore helpful to examine the sectors and subsectors that will experience the largest
price changes as a result of the EUSAA.
Recall, in our model, the implementation of the EUSAA impacts import prices through
two channels: rst, directly via the reduction in taris (aecting demand); and second,
indirectly via the change in the share of EU-sourced imports in overall imports of the
product (aecting exporter substitution). The impact of the EUSAA, as measured by
these changes in protection and import prices, is highly asymmetric. Table 4 lists the
20 (ISIC) subsectors that will experience the largest product price declines as a result
of the EUSAA, and also aggregates this information for each ISIC 1-digit sector. The
calculations for this exercise are performed for the \no exclusion list" (upper panel) and
\20 percent exclusion list" (lower panel) scenarios. The results indicate that the extent
to which subsectors are impacted by the agreement in terms of changes in protection and
import prices is extremely heterogeneous across subsectors. For example, whereas subsec-
tor 742 (architectural, engineering and other technical activities) experiences a reduction
in protection from 30% to zero and an average import price decline of about 34.6% when
no exclusion list is used, most other subsectors are aected only marginally.
Table 4 also shows that a given choice of exclusion list can greatly impact the relative
vulnerability of dierent subsectors. To continue with our example, subsector 742 is not
even among the 20 most aected sectors when the 20% exclusion list is used. Similarly,
whereas sector D (manufacturing) experiences the largest import price change in the
scenario without an exclusion list, it is much better shielded from the impact of reform
when the 20% exclusion list is used; sector C (mining and quarrying) becomes the sector
experiencing the largest reduction in import prices in the latter case.
We now consider the more realistic scenario of a sequential phased-in agreement (Ta-
21If suciently detailed sectoral production data was available, it would be straightforward to deter-
mine likely changes in employment and production in response to the reform, but that exercise would
take us beyond the scope of this paper.
15Table 4: Largest changes in protection and
prices due to the EUSAA, by both sector
and subsectory
ISIC Sector Protection Price
change (%) change (%)
Without exclusion list
A Agriculture -8.9 -0.3
B Fishing 0.0 0.0
C Mining and quarrying -44.1 -0.6
D Manufacturing -27.4 -1.5
E Utilities 0.0 0.0
F{Q Services -6.0 -0.1
742 Architectural -100.0 -34.6
181 Apparel -38.6 -11.9
342 Motor vehicle bodies -73.3 -11.8
314 Accumulators and cells -48.6 -10.4
192 Footwear -26.1 -7.7
322 Tele/radio transmitters -88.2 -6.9
343 Motor vehicle parts -50.1 -6.4
12 Animal farming -97.1 -5.8
341 Motor vehicles -24.4 -5.1
332 Optical instruments -45.2 -3.8
191 Leather -17.7 -3.8
293 Domestic appliances -18.0 -3.1
331 Medical appliances -55.0 -2.7
221 Publishing -86.3 -2.6
313 Wire and cable -69.0 -2.5
242 Other chemicals -70.5 -2.3
173 Knitted fabrics -15.1 -1.8
289 Other fabricated metal -33.3 -1.7
323 Tele/radio receivers -10.2 -1.7
361 Furniture -11.7 -1.7
With 20% exclusion list
A Agriculture -2.9 -0.1
B Fishing 0.0 0.0
C Mining and quarrying -42.2 -0.6
D Manufacturing -5.6 -0.4
E Utilities 0.0 0.0
F{Q Services -0.6 0.0
12 Animal farming -94.6 -5.6
221 Publishing -83.6 -2.5
331 Medical instruments -46.6 -2.3
322 Tele/radio transmitters -20.8 -1.7
101 Coal mining -100.0 -1.5
103 Peat extraction -100.0 -1.5
352 Locomotives -66.4 -1.4
242 Other chemicals -40.8 -1.4
289 Other fabricated metal -17.9 -1.0
172 Other textiles -16.6 -0.9
142 Other mining -74.4 -0.9
312 Electricity distribution -34.9 -0.9
152 Dairy -27.7 -0.8
313 Wire and cable -17.2 -0.7
319 Other electrical -11.9 -0.7
315 Lighting equipment -8.7 -0.7
291 General purpose machinery -19.9 -0.6
252 Plastics -20.2 -0.6
232 Rened petroleum -56.3 -0.6
343 Motor vehicle parts -3.9 -0.6
y For comparability, one-digit ISIC sectors are reported.
Subsectors are chosen and ordered by those with the
largest price changes, assuming elasticity parameters of
P = 0:5, DS = 1:0, and ES = 1:5.
16ble 5). We allow sequencing to occur over the 12-year period over 4 three-year liberaliza-
tion steps. In the rst step, taris on EU products are capped at 20%. The cap is reduced
to 10% in the second step, 5% in the third, and in the nal step, taris are eliminated
completely.22 We also assume the absence of an exclusion list at this point; the numbers
shown should therefore be interpreted as an estimated upper bound on the projected
impact of the agreement. It is important to remember, however, that TRIST has been
designed with the specic task of providing policy makers with important insights into
the short-term eects of trade reform. It has not been designed for making longer-term
predictions about the economy wide impact of trade reform; TRIST only looks at the
import side of the economy whereas trade reform will also have an impact on exporting
sectors by reducing bias against exporting. For the sequenced scenario in particular, this
implies that TRIST does not project the actual revenue impact throughout the imple-
mentation horizon. It rather shows how dierent steps during the phase-in period of the
trade agreement compare in terms of short term revenue and import volume impacts.
The aggregate impact of the sequential implementation of the EUSAA on tari rev-
enue and overall trade tax revenue is very similar to the impact of the static scenario
discussed previously, although we would point out that the nal liberalization step gen-
erates, by far, the largest losses in revenue: This step leads to a tari revenue reduction
of 11.6% and a trade tax revenue fall of 6.5%, with the average collected tari rate falling
from 5.5% to 4.9%.
3.2.2 Changes to the import regime
Having investigated the impact of the EUSAA, we now move to a broader analysis of the
Syrian import regime which has undergone signicant reform over the past decade. As a
rst step, we investigate the revenue implications of redesigning the tari band structure.
We assume that the new bands are dened in terms of statutory rates, with no tari
exemptions granted post-reform.23 There are several options for tari band structures
that would reduce the number of tari bands. We consider three possibilities. Our rst
approach collapses the existing bands into four bands by xing all rates above 40% at
35%, all rates above 20% and below or equal to 40% at 30%, raising bands above 10%
(5%) and below or equal to 20% (10%) to 20% (10%), and eliminating all nuisance taris
completely; we denote this Option A. The second approach likewise introduces four bands.
It diers from the rst option only in its treatment of taris lesser than or equal 20%.
22Since we assume that collected taris are capped at these thresholds, this also implies that the caps
already take tari exemptions into account.
23Alternatively, depending on the likely volume of tari exemptions, post-reform tari bands could
also be set higher to obtain the same revenue impact.
17Table 5: Trade impact of a multi-phased Association Agree-
ment with the EUy
20% cap 15% cap 10% cap Zero taris
Impact on imports
Imports pre 607.3* 608.4 609.2 609.9
Imports post 608.4 609.2 609.9 611.8
Change (%) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
Impact on revenue
Tari revenue pre 39.3 36.3 34.7 33.3
Tari revenue post 36.3 34.7 33.3 29.5
Change (%) -7.6 -5.6 -4.6 -11.6
Total import tax revenue
Total revenue pre 66.8 63.7 62.1 60.6
Total revenue post 63.7 62.1 60.6 56.8
Change (%) -4.6 -3.3 -2.6 -6.5
Collected tari rates
Tari rate pre 6.5 6.0 5.7 5.5
Tari rate post 6.0 5.7 5.5 4.8
Change (%) -7.8 -5.7 -4.7 -11.8
y Sequencing of agreement implemented in 3-year liberalization steps, under-
taken over 12 years, with indicated tari caps applied on EU imports. Scenar-
ios simulated assuming elasticity parameters of P = 0:5 and ES = 1:5, with
no exclusion list.
* All values are given in in billions of SYP.
More specically, Option B xes bands above 10% (5%) and below or equal to 20% (10%)
to 10% (5%) and increases all nuisance taris to 5%. A third approach is to eliminate all
taris above 40% completely, to x rates above 20% and below or equal to 40% at 35%
and to raise taris bands above 10% (5%; 0%) and below or equal to 20% (10%; 5%) to
their respective upper boundaries (Option C). We summarize the implications of these
various reform options in Table 6.
The rst column of Table 7 highlights the impact of reform Option A on Syrian trade
revenues. The gures project large revenue losses|24.9% in terms of lost tari revenue
and 14.9% in terms of lost overall trade tax revenue|that would result from the reform.
This is in sharp contrast to the ndings for Option B, which is projected to have an
almost revenue-neutral impact.
The highly dierential impact of the two trade reform scenarios on revenues is striking,
but there is a straightforward explanation which, once again, is due to the skewness of the
distribution of pre-reform tari bands toward low taris. Recall, the dierence between
18Table 6: Designs on alternative tari bandsy
Option A Option B Option C
Old collected taris New collected taris
Tari > 40 35 35 0
Tari > 20 &  30 30 30 35
Tari > 10 &  20 20 10 20
Tari > 5 &  10 10 5 10
Tari > 0 &  5 0 5 5
Tari = 0 0 0 0
y Taris dened as collected taris, in percentage terms.
the two reform scenarios is the dierential treatment of taris lower than or equal to 20%.
Specically, the design of Option A pushes the 10{20% bands to their upper limits (while
simultaneously eliminating nuisance taris), whereas Option B xes the 10{20% bands
at their lower limits (while xing nuisance rates at their upper bound). This means that
the trade impact of Option A (Option B) would be driven more by taris at or below
5% (between 10{20%). We see this consequence when we compare the rst two columns
of Table 7, which underscores how the tari band structure is strongly inuenced by the
treatment of nuisance taris.
Finally, column 3 of Table 7 presents our model's projections for the impact of Op-
tion C on Syrian revenues. While the complete elimination of all taris above 40% is not,
in general, a realistic or progressive one, the exercise is designed to stress the point that
reducing (or totally eliminating) very high tari rates would not necessarily be detrimen-
tal to revenues. Any incurred losses are easily oset by some minor adjustments to the
remaining bands. Since high tari rates are relatively infrequent, this is hardly surpris-
ing. Nonetheless, given how their removal may entail a major simplication of the tari
regime that is not accompanied by a disruptive surge in imports, a cut of the highest
tari rates should be high on the policy agenda.
We now turn to investigating reform strategies for reducing the excessive number of
additional import charges applied at the border. We consider the impact of a reduction
in the number of additional import charges on trade revenues, along with the eect of
a concomitant implementation of a VAT to make up for projected revenue losses. In
particular, we allow for six distinct reform scenarios: First, we eliminate all trade taxes
with the exception of taris and the spending tax (Reform A); second, all trade taxes
besides taris are eliminated (Reform B); third (fourth), the elimination of all trade taxes
is coupled with the conversion of the spending tax into a 3% (5%) VAT on all products
(Reform C; Reform D); and last, the elimination of all trade taxes is coupled with the
19Table 7: Trade impact of various options for sim-
plication of tari regimey
Option A Option B Option C
Impact on imports
Imports pre 607.3* 607.3 607.3
Imports post 611.5 606.0 604.9
Change (%) 0.7 -0.2 -0.4
Impact on revenue
Tari revenue pre 39.3 39.3 39.3
Tari revenue post 29.6 40.1 40.6
Change (%) -24.9 1.8 3.1
Total import tax revenue
Total revenue pre 66.8 66.8 66.8
Total revenue post 56.8 67.4 67.8
Change (%) -14.9 0.9 1.6
Collected tari rates
Tari rate pre 6.5 6.5 6.5
Tari rate post 4.8 6.6 6.7
Change (%) -25.4 2.0 3.5
y Scenarios simulated assuming elasticity parameters of P = 0:5
and ES = 1:5.
* All values are given in in billions of SYP.
conversion of the spending tax into a 10% (12%) VAT on all consumer and capital goods
(Reform E; Reform F). These simulations are reported in Table 8.
The results presented in Table 8 conrm the importance of some of the additional
trade taxes as a share of Syrian trade tax revenues. An elimination of all trade taxes,
besides taris and the revenue tax, would imply a reduction in revenues of 20.5%, while
a simultaneous abolishment of the latter is projected to lead to an overall reduction of
almost 40%. Consequently, caution is in order when implementing any reform involving
the elimination of one or more|or even all|of these trade taxes, as the revenue impact
is nontrivial.
However, columns three to six of Table 8 show that an appropriate (but still reason-
able) choice of a VAT (to be implemented in 2010) may more than outweigh these losses.
The advantage of a VAT|and the reason why it is so powerful in making up for revenue
losses|is that it is levied on every product without exception (while concomitantly min-
imizing distortion). While the elimination of all trade taxes combined with a VAT on all






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21an only slightly increased VAT rate of 5%, is projected to ensure a considerable gain in
trade revenues (of 7.2%). When we repeat these scenarios in Reform E and Reform F|
with the modication that the VAT is now only levied on consumer goods and capital
goods|the results suggest that in these cases a rate between 10% and 12% would be
sucient to keep the reform more or less revenue neutral.24
3.3 Comprehensive revenue-neutral reform
Our nal policy experiment is to combine the rationalization scenarios discussed in Ta-
bles 7 and 8 into one comprehensive reform, with a focus on designing a reasonable reform
that has a neutral or slightly positive impact on revenues. Our comprehensive reform
combines tari band simplication along the lines of Option A, coupled with the elimi-
nation of all additional trade taxes along the lines of Reform A. We pair this with the
introduction of a VAT (levied on consumer and capital goods only) of 15% (Scenario A).
Scenario B combines Option B with Reform A, and introduces a slightly lower VAT of
12%. Note that since both VATs considered are applied only to a subset of all goods, we
can regard these two rates|needed to guarantee the revenue neutrality of the reform|as
upper bounds on any actual rates that may be introduced.
Table 9 suggests that the combination of the tari band reform following Option A
(which, recall, has a projected trade tax revenue loss of 14.9%), along with the elimination
of all additional trade taxes following Reform A (which implies import tax revenue losses
of 20.5%), could be held more or less revenue neutral if a VAT of 15% on consumer
and capital goods were to be implemented simultaneously (the model actually predicts
a slight gain of 1.2% in total trade tax revenue). Moreover, the second column suggests
that tari band reform via Option B (projected trade tax revenue gain of 0.9%), likewise
combined with the elimination of all trade taxes, could even result in a considerable gain
in revenues (of 6.5%).
24The reason why we distinguish the case of a VAT levied on consumer and capital goods only is because
the VAT on intermediate or primary products is usually subject to the possibility for rebate. Although
the VAT will be levied on the respective nal product at a later point, the primary or intermediate goods'
contribution to the value of the nal product is unclear ex ante. In the context of our attempt to isolate
the impact of the VAT on trade revenues, the case of a VAT levied on consumer and capital goods only
may give us an broad estimate of the upper bound on the VAT rate that is needed to guarantee revenue
neutrality of the reform according to our model. For example, in order to generate a revenue gain of
5.8% in the case of Reform F, our model predicts that a VAT of 12% or below is needed.
22Table 9: Trade impact of two potential com-
prehensive reform scenariosy
Scenario A Scenario B
Impact on imports
Imports pre 607.3* 607.3
Imports post 606.2 604.4
Change (%) 0.2 0.5
Impact on revenue
Tari revenue pre 39.3 39.3
Tari revenue post 28.5 39.4
Change (%) -27.5 0.2
Total import tax revenue
Total revenue pre 66.8 66.8
Total revenue post 67.6 71.1
Change (%) 1.2 6.5
Collected tari ratesz
Tari rate pre 6.5 6.5
Tari rate post 4.7 6.5
Change (%) -27.4 0.7
y Scenario simulated assuming elasticity parameters of P =
0:5 and ES = 1:5.
z Collected tari rate refers to rate on applied taris. *
* All values are given in in billions of SYP.
3.4 Robustness of scenarios




. We choose three scenarios|the rst three in each
of our major classes of policy reform|for which we present variations in tari and overall
trade tax revenue changes in response to variations in

PES
. While, in the interests of
keeping the robustness results reasonably transparent, we do not report sensitivity results
for all scenarios, nor do we present estimates for changes in all the variables of interest.
Nonetheless, the results oer a good general impression of the sensitivity of the results
to changes in the model's key parameters. These sensitivity checks are summarized in
Table 10, with tari (trade tax) revenue losses reported on the left (right) half.
Table 9 shows that the results of our trade reform scenarios are not excessively sen-
sitive to sensible changes in the model's parameters. The numbers reect that, following
tari liberalization, an increase in the exporter substitution elasticity leads to more sub-
stitution between exporters toward those that receive tari preferences, which increases
23Table 10: Sensitivity of changes in tari and
trade tax revenue losses, by scenario
Tari revenue Trade tax revenue
EUSAA with no exclusion list
ES ES
P 1.0* 1.5 3.0 P 1.0 1.5 3.0
0.3 -23.8 -24.8 -27.5 0.3 -14.5 -15.1 -16.7
0.5 -23.3 -24.3 -27.0 0.5 -14.0 -14.7 -16.3
1.0 -22.1 -23.1 -25.7 1.0 -12.9 -13.6 -15.2
Tari option A
ES ES
P 1.0 1.5 3.0 P 1.0 1.5 3.0
0.3 -25.3 -25.4 -25.8 0.3 -15.3 -15.4 -15.5
0.5 -24.8 -24.9 -25.2 0.5 -14.9 -14.9 -15.0
1.0 -23.5 -23.6 -23.9 1.0 -13.8 -13.8 -13.9
Comprehensive scenario A
ES ES
P 1.0 1.5 3.0 P 1.0 1.5 3.0
0.3 -26.9 -27.1 -27.5 0.3 2.5 2.4 2.0
0.5 -27.3 -27.5 -27.9 0.5 1.3 1.2 0.9
1 -28.4 -28.5 -28.8 1 -1.8 -1.8 -1.9
* Numbers reported in percentage terms.
tari revenue losses. Since taris are part of the tax base of the spending tax and the
revenue tax, the fall in tari revenues also decreases revenues for the latter. An increase
in the demand elasticity generates a stronger increase in imports as a response to a given
tari liberalization. This increases both tari and trade tax revenues. The reasoning is
similar for the case of a reduction in other trade taxes. The key dierence is that trade
taxes do not form part of the tax base for taris, such that the fall in revenues from, say,
the spending tax or the revenue tax does not directly reduce tari revenues.
4 Policy Directions for Trade Reform in Syria
Between 1960 and 2000, the Syrian economy largely operated as a socialist economy,
with extensive central planning and signicant state intervention. In part due to this
economic history, many Syrian ocials favor a deterministic, engineered approach with
regard to the state's policy reform eorts. Credible, successful policy reform in Syria
24therefore requires not just broad, generic policy prescriptions, but rather a measured
approach that is accompanied by a proper articulation of the quantitative implications
and consequences of any given policy proposal.
Our treatment of continued trade policy reform in Syria has therefore sought to
provide a clear rendering of the adjustment costs associated with the two main pol-
icy scenarios|participation in the EUSAA and further reform of the trade regime|that
Syrian policymakers are currently in the process of contemplating. As a result, we regard
the estimates provided in Section 3 as more than just a technical exercise, but rather
an important input into the policy decisionmaking apparatus, and one that is especially
valuable in the political-economic context of Syria.
As important as such gures are for Syrian policymaking, there are nonetheless im-
portant additional considerations that are of a more practical nature. In this section, we
lay out some of the more major issues that Syrian policymakers are likely to confront.
In Subsection 3.2.1, we included simulations for several alternative coverages for an
exclusion list. It is important to emphasize that our choice is based on purely technical
reasoning, and that we do not advocate that the Syrian government necessarily choose
an actual exclusion list along these lines, since doing so would clearly run counter to
the purpose of the agreement to begin with. However, conditional on the fact that
Syrian policymakers may, on various grounds, decide to exclude certain products from
liberalization as part of the agreement, the results in Table 3 oer a broad range of the
likely magnitude of the reform impact, and serve to illustrate the point that the choice
of the exclusion list is an important determinant of the relative vulnerability of dierent
sectors of the Syrian economy.
These ndings suggest that the revenue consequences are likely to be manageable if
an appropriate exclusion list is chosen. Irrespective of the revenue implications of the
agreement, the fall in prices of imported consumer and intermediate goods in response
to tari liberalization is advantageous for consumers and producers, and will partially
remove the signicant anti-export bias in the Syrian economy, to the extent that the
respective taris are not protecting signicant amounts of production and employment.
It is therefore helpful for policymakers to examine the sectors and subsectors that will
experience the largest price changes as a result of the EUSAA.
What is more, the revenue impact of the agreement can be spread out over its im-
plementation period. In contrasting the one-shot versus sequential EUSAA rollout, it is
clear from Table 5 that the nal liberalization step entails the largest tari revenue losses.
In a sense, this is unsurprising given the large number of nuisance taris in the Syrian
import regime. However, it serves to highlight how an informed design of the phase-out
25schedule of the agreement calls for special attention to the fact that the distribution of
taris is highly skewed toward the lower end. Depending on the priorities of policymakers
in distributing revenue losses over the 12-year period, it may be worthwhile shifting some
of the burden resulting from the last liberalization step toward earlier ones. Alterna-
tively, the phasing-out process could be given a dierent structure; rather than capping
taris at lower and lower values, a step-by-step percentage reduction in all taris may be
preferable.
It is important to recognize that, for a small country such as Syria, a gradual phas-
ing out of trade barriers will likely result in smaller welfare gains relative to an ap-
proach calling for an immediate phase-out (Kouparitsas 2001). Nonetheless, political
economy factors|especially with regard to fears over ex post revenue losses by the Fi-
nance Ministry|would suggest that the sequential approach that we lay out in Table 5
remains the most feasible policy option.
Our design of tari simplication in Subsection 3.2.2 was inuenced by what we regard
as the three major problems in Syria's current import regime. These are the excessively
complicated tari structure (as evidenced by the number of non-zero tari bands), the
large number of tari lines with nuisance rates, and the proliferation of (often arbitrary)
additional charges applied at the border. All these features increase the complexity of
the import regime, and make it less transparent and more costly for customs authorities
to administer. The complexity of procedures is also a potential source of corruption. The
tari simplication options outlined in Table 6 are thus a reection of these concerns.
We recognize that the estimates provided in Tables 7 and 8 are by no means an
exhaustive accounting of all possible revenue-neutral reform options. While it is certainly
possible to generate a reater range of other designs, we refrain from doing so, since the
nal choice for tari reform will ultimately be made according to the priorities of Syrian
policymakers, and these are not, ex ante, immediately obvious. What we would like to
emphasize, however, is that the ndings in these tables suggest that revenue concerns
should not be a reason to shy away from a reform that would likely involve substantial
eciency gains. In other words, a reform of the highly complicated Syrian tari regime
involving a simplication of the tari band structure can be implemented in the absence
of substantial revenue losses if an informed choice is made with respect to the dierential
treatment of pre-reform tari bands, along with a willingness to entertain the possibility
of a VAT.
Throughout the paper, a central principle that guided has our policy prescriptions
has been the recognition that scal considerations are often paramount for developing
countries embarking on a path of trade liberalization, and that the revenue adjustment
26dynamics of any given trade policy is likely to involve painful adjustment costs, especially
in the short run (Bevan 1999). Nonetheless, the comprehensive reform scenarios captured
in Table 9 suggest that mitigation measures that seek to preserve revenue neutrality
are not only desirable, but eminently possible. We therefore regard the two scenarios
introduced in Subsection 3.3 as our best recommendations for an appropriate policy mix
that gives adequate consideration to eciency, revenue, and political-economy concerns.
5 Conclusion
The ability to successfully implement any trade policy reform, as well as a reasonable
evaluation of its ex post impact on national welfare, is often tied to the quality of ex
ante evaluations of trade-related adjustment costs. Estimates of these adjustment costs
are crucial in building the political-economic case for reform, as well as for practically
implementing mitigation and adaptation policies.
This paper seeks to provide these estimates for Syria, which is an interesting case both
because it is an economy that is transitioning from a centrally planned system|which
has led to a proliferation of border charges applied by multiple actors|as well as because
it highlights the tremendous eciency gains that are possible from tari rationalization,
even when revenue neutrality is to be maintained. The estimates show that the impact
of a substantial simplication of the Syrian import regime on revenue can be close to
neutral, while the eciency gains in terms of resulting cost savings are likely to be
substantial. A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the implications of an
Association Agreement with the European Union: the revenue impact is likely to be small
if an appropriate exclusion list is chosen, and can be spread out over an implementation
period of 20{25 years.
These ndings can be used to inform the existing policy debate. The dierent reform
options considered show how an informed design of the reform alternatives can lead to
substantial dierences in the magnitude of their impact on the Syrian economy, both in
terms of revenues and protection. Ensuring that revenue neutrality is preserved during
tari reform may engender greater acceptance among government bodies concerned that
scal integrity would otherwise be compromised. Moreover, in scenarios where a clear set
of losers can be identied, our results provide estimates that can be used in the design of
compensatory mechanisms. These subsidies may even lead to Pareto-improving reform
outcomes that would otherwise be regarded as politically unpalatable (Davidson, Matusz
& Nelson 2007).
The most straightforward way forward for further consolidating import liberalization
27in Syria therefore calls for a reduction in the number of tari bands that are currently
applied, from the existing 11 to perhaps 3 or 4 bands, with the lower bound for ad valorem
taris held at or above the nuisance level of 5%. In addition, the myriad number of xed
and proportional trade taxes can be removed with revenue neutrality ensured by the
implementation of an appropriately sized VAT.
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Technical Appendix
The precise calculation of the price change resulting from a trade policy change depends
on how a country applies its taris and other trade taxes and charges. In Syria, taris
are collected as a percentage of the c.i.f. import value, the spending tax, and the revenue
tax are levied on the tari-inclusive c.i.f. import value, while other charges|such as the
city local tax|are a complex combination of xed amounts as well as percentage shares
of more than a dozen dierent tax bases; for simplicity, however, we assume that all other
charges are calculated as a percentage of the c.i.f. import value.
A given ceteris paribus tari change for good i from exporter j leads to a percentage










(1 + speij)(1 + revij)(1 + remij)
 (1 + ij)(1 + speij)(1 + revij)(1 + remij)
#
(1 + ij)(1 + speij)(1 + revij)(1 + remij)
;
(A.1)
where ij, speij, revij and remij are the tari, the spending tax, the revenue tax and
an aggregate of all other charges applied on good i from country j, respectively, and a
prime indicates the post-reform value of a variable. For what follows, we utilize the tari
29change in (A.1) as the trade policy shock, and describe the demand response changes
that result.
The demand response for a given product is modeled in three consecutive steps: First,
the model calculates how the allocation of expenditure on imports of a product changes
across dierent country suppliers when taris are amended. These relative import changes
are computed from the price change in (A.1), adjusted by the elasticity of substitution
between exports. To isolate just the substitution eect, total exports are held constant.25






















where ES is the elasticity of substitution between exports from dierent supplier coun-
tries.
Second, the model calculates how the allocation of expenditure between domestic and
foreign sources of a product is aected when the relative price of imports (to domestic
goods) changes in response to trade reform.26 This is implemented in two stages: First,
relative demand changes are computed from changes in the aggregate (weighted average)
price of imports, adjusted by the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
products. Individual suppliers then receive their share in the aggregate change in the
demand for imported and domestically produced good respectively according to their






































ij is (initial) aggregate imports, and the percentage change in the aggre-
gate price of imports is
















25This involves deating post-substitution imports from each supplier, by multiplying the ratio of total
imports of the product before tari reform to the sum of imports of the product from all trading partners
after the substitution eects.
26As mentioned in the text, this eect cannot be taken into account in the case of this paper as
suciently detailed sectoral production data is not available for Syria.
30Third, the model calculates how a product's domestic consumption (and thus both
imports and domestic production) is aected by a change in its average domestic price.
The price change is computed as a consumption share weighted average between imports
and domestically produced goods. As before, this is implemented in stages, with in-
duced consumption changes distributed across domestic and foreign sources, as well as
between all importers, according to their shares in the domestic and the import markets,














































where a dash indicates a post-reform value of a variable, XTD
i is the initial total demand




n xij is (initial) demand
for domestic output, and the percentage change in the aggregate price of imports is
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